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Some of the most enduring disagreements in the alliance between the United States and the Republic of 
Korea (ROK) concern ballistic missile defenses (BMD). At the same time that South Korea has expanded its 
conventional offensive missile program, it has declined American proposals for a regionally integrated BMD 
architecture, insisting on developing its own national system in parallel to the defenses operated by U.S. 
Forces Korea (USFK). American appeals for interoperability between U.S. and ROK systems have been 
received cautiously, as were proposals to enhance its own BMD in Korea by introducing the Terminal High-
Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) to the Peninsula for several years. A desire for expanded autonomy in 
national security appears to underpin Seoul’s attitudes on BMD. Rather than rely passively on American 
protection against North Korea’s nuclear and missile threats, South Korea’s military leaders have focused on 
developing precision-strike capabilities to intimidate Pyongyang, and resisted simply accepting an American 
BMD umbrella. Even more than they desire greater independence from their American patron-ally, South 
Koreans are suspicious of entanglements with Japan, their former colonial master, whose own defensive 
systems are already integrated with the American regional BMD architecture. This outlook encourages the 






South Korea (the Republic of Korea, or ROK) has the unusual distinction of hosting two 
unrelated ballistic missile defense (BMD) systems: one for the South Korean military and 
another for U.S. Forces Korea (USFK). Despite the standing presence of over 25,000 American 
troops, yoked to South Korea’s armed forces in a Combined Forces Command (CFC); despite 
routine joint training and exercises between the two allies; and despite almost two decades of 
urgings from the United States to build an integrated BMD architecture, the two systems have 
remained separate. Even while Washington negotiated with Seoul for permission to enhance 
USFK’s defenses by deploying the Terminal High-Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) system to 
the Peninsula, South Korea has remained committed to its own national Korean Air and Missile 
Defense (KAMD) system, based on a variety of technologies from different sources, including 
indigenously produced interceptors. Years of pledges by South Korean defense officials have 
produced little observable progress toward making the separate American and Korean systems 
interoperable, despite benefits for the effectiveness of allied BMD in the theater. 
 
South Korea’s approach to BMD is thus at a great remove from America’s experience with other 
allies. The European Phased Adaptive Approach (EPAA), adopted early in the Obama 
administration, has been portrayed as a model for other regional architectures, but South Korea’s 
choices have allowed for only halting progress toward regional integration.1 While the missile 
threat from North Korea (the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, or DPRK) justifies and 
motivates South Korea’s interest in BMD capabilities, it has not, by itself, determined the ROK’s 
approach. Instead, concerns unrelated to the operational effectiveness of any particular BMD 
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South Korean BMD Concerns 
 
The first and greatest issue has been cost relative to perceived benefit; very simply, the South 
Korean defense establishment has preferred to invest in offensive missile capabilities to 
intimidate North Korea with the threat of precision strikes. Not far behind is national pride, in the 
form of South Korea’s desire for greater independence from its patron-ally, the United States, 
and its resistance to entanglements with its former colonial master, Japan. Other considerations 
have included sensitivity to the concerns of China, which is South Korea’s top trading partner 
and main opportunity for leverage on North Korean behavior, and perhaps also the interests of 
South Korea’s own defense industries.  
 
Many of these issues and concerns have found their most visible expression in areas not 
immediately or uniquely linked to BMD. Korea has never truly been able to determine its own 
fate in the modern era; security issues therefore tend to impinge strongly on Korean national 
pride. One prominent example in the period discussed in this paper is the premature decision for 
the transfer of wartime operational control of the armed forces (OPCON) by 2012, initially 
agreed between the Minister of National Defense and the U.S. Secretary of Defense in fall 2006.2 
After North Korea’s armed attacks against South Korea in 2010, the allies began to reconsider 
the original timeline for OPCON transfer, and then substituted a “conditions-based” process 
without fixed dates. Nevertheless, the retention of the commitment to OPCON transfer by two 
subsequent pro-American governments in Seoul testifies to the power of national feelings in 
South Korea.3 These same feelings have informed repeated decisions to resist the adoption of a 
common, integrated BMD architecture. 
 
Another aspect of Korean nationalism, in the form of anti-Japanese sentiment, also helps to 
explain Seoul’s desire for a separate BMD system. The American BMD architecture in the Asia-
Pacific region is integrated with Japan’s; this is the system that Washington would like to see 
Seoul join. Even the mutually beneficial decision to share sensor data between the ROK the 
United States could therefore contribute indirectly to the defense of Japan, Korea’s former 
colonial master, whose intentions many Koreans continue to suspect. There are many examples 
of Korea’s allergy to Japan from the period under consideration; the most salient would be the 
April 2011 episode, when the Korean side balked at the last moment rather than sign an 
agreement with Japan to permit the sharing of sensitive defense data (a General Security of 
Military Information Agreement, or GSOMIA), finally concluded in in the months after North 
Korea’s fifth nuclear test, despite continued public opposition in South Korea. American efforts 
to bring about trilateral defense cooperation have had some incremental successes since this 
time, but the years-long delay in signing the ROK-Japan GSOMIA has been emblematic of the 
serious obstacles to cooperation.4 
 
A third factor, involving the dominant perspective in China on the significance of BMD 
deployments, may also have contributed to South Korea’s go-slow approach on acquiring BMD 
and especially on achieving interoperability with American systems. China is South Korea’s 
most important trading partner by far; it is also widely viewed as the only country capable of 
keeping the North Koreans in line. Probably for these reasons, Seoul has at times shown 
sensitivity to China’s concerns about the American alliance network perched on its doorstep, 
including the role of BMD. A special concern sometimes reflected in the Chinese media is the 
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tendency of a multinational BMD architecture to embed the U.S. military more deeply in the 
region.5  
 
A fourth potential concern may be a desire to create greater opportunities for South Korea’s 
defense industry. In practice, this concern can be difficult to distinguish from nationalistic 
sentiment; the belief that independent defense capabilities are crucial to the ROK’s autonomy 
goes hand-in-hand with favoring indigenous defense development and production. It is also 
consistent with South Korea’s long history of industrial policy, including export-oriented 
industry. The defense sector has not been an exception to this pattern.6 
 
Many of these factors appear to have been in play in the recent debate over the deployment of 
THAAD. USFK officials have described the need for these high-altitude interceptors in Korea in 
order to create a “layered defense,” a BMD architecture that permits multiple shots at an 
incoming warhead. After years of discussion in the media, public opposition from the Chinese 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and a debate in Seoul over whether THAAD in Korea could 
somehow contribute to the defense of Japan, the United States and South Korea finally agreed to 
discuss the deployment. Formal talks began soon after North Korea’s fourth nuclear test in 
January 2016 and its second successful space launch in February 2016.7 An agreement to deploy 
was announced in July.8 
 
From a U.S. perspective, South Korea’s reticence has created obstacles to the highly 
collaborative, trilateral defense relationship that the United States has sought to establish 
between itself, Japan, and South Korea since the late 1990s. The ROK’s insistence on a separate, 
parallel BMD system features prominently in this story, not least of all because an effective 
multinational BMD architecture would involve close ties between the allies’ command-and-
control networks.  
 
Reviewing the history of South Korea’s own BMD programs from the mid-1990s to the present 
shows the enduring strength of these concerns. Despite South Korea’s recent movement toward 
cautious acceptance of an enhanced U.S. BMD system on its territory, these issues seem unlikely 
to abate in the foreseeable future. 
 
 
Early Choices: Low Cost and Self-Reliance  
 
South Korea has faced a threat from hundreds of North Korean theater ballistic missiles since 
roughly the late 1980s. Seoul’s concern about the threat grew after a series of North Korean 
ballistic missile flight-tests on May 29, 1993, florid threats from Pyongyang during the nuclear 
crisis of June 1994, and the start of USFK’s deployment of Patriot batteries to protect its own 
facilities.9 These events may have contributed to the start of serious discussions within the ROK 
Ministry of National Defense (MND), no later than fall 1995, about launching a new air and 
missile defense program. This undertaking was justified in terms of the need to replace South 
Korea’s aging fleet of U.S.-supplied Nike-Hercules air-defense missiles.10   
 
One path for the acquisition of a BMD system might have been to acquire new, up-to-date 
systems from a single supplier. Instead, South Korean leaders have persistently sought an 
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independent course, and have resisted the American plans to integrate South Korea for a regional 
BMD architecture that would emerge later in the decade.  
 
Cost concerns were prominent in the information disclosed to the public about the new, so-called 
“SAM-X” program. Media reports starting in early 1996 indicated that the MND was 
considering not only Raytheon’s Patriot systems, but also their Russian counterpart, the Almaz-
Antey S-300. The Russian offering was deemed the leading candidate on the grounds of cost. 
Russia had borrowed heavily from South Korea in the early 1990s, and found in discounted 
military exports to Seoul a way to pay down its debt.11 South Korean interest in acquiring 
Russian systems naturally invited concern from the U.S. military. In May 1998, the USFK 
commander openly voiced his concern about the need for interoperability of American and South 
Korean defensive systems.12 
 
American advice, or pressure, seems to have helped to refocus the SAM-X program on Patriot 
PAC-3 BMD systems, but this shift led to seemingly insuperable cost problems. Although SAM-
X survived defense budget cuts after the financial crisis of 1997 and the election of opposition 
leader Kim Dae-jung to the presidency, it was subjected to repeated, years-long delays on 
account of lack of adequate funding.13  Shortfalls in funding became an enduring theme in South 
Korean BMD acquisition from this time on, even as the country’s own ballistic and cruise 
missile programs have prospered.14 
 
North Korea’s launch of a TD-1 multistage rocket over Japan on August 31, 1998 renewed 
interest in the United States in establishing a National Missile Defense (NMD) and a regional, 
multinational Theater Missile Defense (TMD) in Northeast Asia, an idea that Japan was quick to 
embrace.15 The South Korean leadership was reticent about involvement from the start. Even 
once the MND had accepted the need for a Patriot buy, Minister of National Defense Chun 
Yong-tack drew a sharp line against participating in the U.S. architecture, questioning its 
efficacy for deterring North Korea, citing the potential response of other regional countries, i.e., 
China, and noting South Korea’s own lack of sufficient funds, and its lack of advanced defense 
technology. His successors would offer similar statements as well.16  
 
Seoul may well have been wary of involvement in a defense architecture that could be seen as 
participating in the “containment” of China; keeping China closer to the ROK than the DPRK 
has been an important South Korean objective since the end of the Cold War. Minister Chun’s 
reference to defense technology was perhaps even more significant, reflecting the yearning to 
achieve greater self-reliance in defense. Always being in need of superior foreign technology for 
national defense would mean that the ROK would never be able to choose its own course.17 
Implicitly, if the DPRK could build its own missiles to threaten the ROK, then the ROK should 
be able to make its own missile defenses, not to mention missiles for threatening retaliation, 
unless it was content to rely permanently on the protection of the United States. Under the 
presidency of Kim Dae-jung, too, South Korea’s approach to the North leaned toward diplomacy 
and aid rather than new defense expenditures.  
 
Although South Korea was too hard-pressed financially to invest the anticipated roughly one 
trillion won (about $1 billion) needed to acquire a state-of-the-art theater BMD system like PAC-
3, it was able to set aside about 10 billion won (about $10 million) for the Agency for Defense 
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Development (ADD) to start development of an indigenous “medium-range surface-to-air 
missile,” or M-SAM, starting in 1998. (ADD is the developer of South Korea’s indigenous 
missile systems, which bear a close visual resemblance to Russian short-range ballistic missiles.) 
This small effort was expected to take a decade to bear fruit, and was described at the outside as 
involving the assistance from “Russia and other advanced countries.”18  
 
Over time, M-SAM would be portrayed as an anti-aircraft weapon, designed to replace older 
U.S.-supplied Hawk SAMs. The first production M-SAM systems, renamed Cheongung, were 
deployed to the Northwest Islands by early 2016.19 
 
In the meantime, the X-SAM program, which was supposed to fill the gap in South Korea’s 
defenses by acquiring PAC-3 or its equivalent, continued to make little progress. The MND 
failed to find a viable path for acquisition until 2005, when it identified a solution in the form of 




The Korean Air and Missile Defense (KAMD) Concept 
 
Another reason for the slow path to acquisition of BMD was, in all likelihood, a lack of urgency. 
After the launch of the TD-1 over Japan in August 1998, North Korea had agreed to a 
moratorium in space launches and missile tests. Pyongyang adhered to this policy of restraint 
until July 2006, when it flight-tested a barrage of theater ballistic missiles, along with a three-
stage TD-2 launcher. In October 2006, it conducted its first nuclear test. Later that year, South 
Korea announced the development of a new BMD architecture, the Korean Air and Missile 
Defense (KAMD), which officials described as “affordable.” Early media accounts of KAMD 
described it as featuring a network of Patriot batteries, a new, indigenously developed early-
warning radar, and its own dedicated command center.21  
 
In 2008, Seoul’s Defense Acquisition Program Administration (DAPA) finally concluded the 
purchase of the secondhand German PAC-2s, to be linked by new fire-control systems from 
Raytheon. The first shipment from Germany arrived in South Korea late that year, about 13 years 
after the initial decision to replace the superannuated Nike-Hercules. The newly acquired 
interceptors were deployed around ROK Air Force bases.22  
 
Now apparently feeling some urgency to erect a national BMD system, Seoul set aside the idea 
of an indigenous early-warning radar. In fall 2009, DAPA decided to purchase two Super Green 
Pine radars from Israel’s Elta. These radars were originally designed to work with the Arrow 
BMD interceptor jointly developed by the United States and Israel.23 Thus, KAMD was taking 
shape rapidly, with a minimum of equipment purchased directly from the United States. 
 
But even as South Korea continued to receive shipments of old PAC-2 equipment from 
Germany, the MND concluded that these systems were ineffective against the North Korean 
missile threat. The equipment was outmoded and better suited to intercepting aircraft than 
missiles. The aging PAC-2 tracking radars broke down frequently and proved difficult to 
maintain.24  
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In consultations with the United States in late 2012, the government expressed renewed interest 
in acquiring new PAC-3 systems, to be deployed at an early date.25 The U.S. Department of 
Defense received formal notice of Seoul’s interest in a possible purchase in October 2013.26 
Indeed, as early as 2008, descriptions of KAMD future development had broadened to include 
new U.S.-made interceptors, in the form of Raytheon’s SM-2 missiles, to be deployed abroad 
South Korea’s new Aegis-class destroyers.27 Later accounts also indicated an interest in the SM-
6 interceptor, then under development.28  
 
Two other new acquisition tracks also emerged under the KAMD umbrella. The first was naval, 
and moved briskly. As early as January 2008, descriptions of the architecture’s future 
development broadened to include Raytheon’s SM-2 missiles, to be deployed aboard the ROK 
Navy’s new Aegis-capable destroyers.29 Perhaps reflecting ambivalence within Seoul, the 
purchase and delivery of SM-2s have not been highly publicized. A DOD notice from May 2009 
documenting South Korean interest in buying a batch of SM-2s noted that the ROK “already has 
these missiles in its inventory.”30 (Some SM-2s would be displayed in an October 2013 Armed 
Forces Day parade in Seoul.) Later accounts also expressed interest in acquiring the new SM-6 
multi-role naval missile, which operates in both defensive and anti-ship modes.31  
 
The second acquisition track involved more indigenous systems. At the same time that the 
shortcomings of the German PAC-2s were first brought before the public eye, MND also 
revealed news plans for developing another indigenous BMD interceptor, a program called L-
SAM.32 L-SAM has been depicted as an upper-tier interceptor for a layered defense, with the 
lower tier composed of PAC-3 and M-SAM batteries.33 This high-altitude intercept role may 
suggest an additional, unstated reason for Seoul’s early reluctance to discuss an American 
THAAD deployment to Korea; although THAAD is expected to be USFK’s system, and not 
South Korea’s, its presence in Korea might undercut the rationale for L-SAM. 
 
Regardless of the exact configuration, the rapid emergence of the initial KAMD system seems to 
have pushed U.S.-ROK discussions toward the subject of interoperability between allied defense 
systems. South Korean Ministers of National Defense issued essentially identical pledges to 
achieve this goal in each joint statement of the annual ministerial-level U.S.-ROK Security 
Consultative Meeting (SCM) since 2012.34  
 
Despite the operational advantages of having defensive assets exchange data and coordinate 
actions in combat, interoperability appears to have been a source of discomfort for the South 
Koreans. American officials may have contributed to that discomfort by linking the theme of 
interoperability to the unpopular subject of trilateral defense cooperation with Japan, speaking in 
terms of “an interoperable regional missile defense architecture.”35  
 
Perhaps the first concrete indication of progress on interoperability appeared in January 2016, 
when the MND announced plans to install a Link 16 tactical data link between the allies’ 
respective BMD command centers at Osan Air Base.36 The U.S. BMD system uses Link 16 to 
connect the other elements of the system to a Command and Control, Battle Management, and 
Communications System.37 The MND announcement emphasized that the data link would run 
only between the two command centers, which implicitly will remain separate despite their 
proximity, and will not have direct and unmediated access to each other’s BMD assets. Shortly 
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thereafter, it was also announced that the allies would undertake a joint BMD exercise during the 
annual spring military exercises.38 For the time being, at least, this modest level of 
interoperability seems to represent the extent of Seoul’s willingness. 
 
 
Conclusions and recommendations 
 
Overall, KAMD seems to have had little in the way of a consistent system design, and remains 
very much a work in progress. It has emerged as a patchwork quilt—an improvisational 
assemblage of technologies from a variety of foreign and domestic suppliers. Its only fixed 
characteristic is the first word in its name: Korean. Whatever form it may take, KAMD is the 
national BMD system of the Republic of Korea, as opposed to a joint or regional architecture.  
 
This pattern reflects Seoul’s tendency to respond to a variety of pressures and concerns by 
delaying acquisition of big-ticket American systems, selecting low-cost alternatives when 
possible, and investing in locally produced alternatives, all while insisting on the maximum 
operational autonomy. It is invariably North Korean missile and nuclear tests that have spurring 
greater interest in BMD in Seoul and, at least temporarily, greater willingness to collaborate with 
the United States in the BMD field. 
 
As a result, South Korean defense officials have improvised a meandering course on BMD 
development and acquisition, now steering closer to their American partners, now further away. 
American officials may periodically get an impression of progress, but so far that progress 
remains tentative and incremental. With time, as Seoul’s technological capabilities mature, it is 
likely to shift toward an increasingly independent defense posture. Short of a fundamental shift 
in South Korean views on defense technology, national autonomy, or regional politics and 
security, no trilateral BMD system including the U.S. and Japan should be expected to take 
shape. 
 
A certain tension can be seen in South Korea’s approach: the desire to keep costs under control 
conflicts with the goal of avoiding integration into a joint or multinational architecture. A 
multinational approach would presumably offer the best value in terms of operational 
effectiveness, since it would involve relatively mature technologies and take advantage of 
investments already made by foreign partners. Insisting on a low-cost approach to BMD has 
actually forced Seoul to accept some degree of dependence. For example, ROK defense officials 
have felt compelled to explain to reporters that a data link between command centers is desirable, 
since it will give South Korea access to U.S. space-based early warning data—something the 
ROK cannot afford to duplicate. 
 
Faced with this situation, perhaps the most constructive approach for the United States would be 
to consider proposing a jointly developed U.S.-ROK defensive architecture, separate from its 
U.S.-Japanese equivalent, which would create a joint capability at substantial cost savings for 
South Korea. While this approach would not resolve all South Korean concerns, it would help to 
remove the most acute issue. Despite a desire for greater freedom of action, as well as anxiety 
about the intentions of U.S. President-elect Donald Trump, South Korea’s leaders are far from 
ready to separate themselves from their alliance from the United States. The continuing USFK 
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presence helps to deter serious North Korean aggression, and may even be seen as offering a 
counterweight to China’s growing military power. Seoul’s interest in BMD has grown since the 
end of the North Korean missile-test moratorium and the first North Korean nuclear test, both in 
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Timeline 
 
Late 1980s: Emergence of a large-scale North Korean theater ballistic missile threat. 
 
May 29, 1993: Four North Korean theater ballistic missile tests. 
 
June 1994: North Korean nuclear crisis. 
 
October 1995: Earliest South Korean media references to SAM-X program. 
 
1995-1996: Earliest USFK Patriot deployments. 
 
August 31, 1998: North Korean TD-1 space launcher overflies Japan. 
 
November 1998: Earliest South Korean media references to M-SAM program. 
 
July 4 and 5, 2006: North Korean ends missile testing moratorium with six theater ballistic 
missile tests and first TD-2 space launch attempt. 
 
October 9, 2006: First North Korean nuclear test. 
 
October 2006: Earliest South Korean media references to Korean Air and Missile Defense 
(KAMD). 
 
2008: Negotiations to acquire German PAC-2 systems are concluded; deliveries to South Korea 
commence. 
 
January 2008: Earliest South Korean media references to interest in acquisition of SM-2 naval 
interceptors from the United States. 
 
February 2008: Earliest South Korean media references to interest in acquisition of SM-6 naval 
interceptors from the United States. 
 
2009: Negotiations to acquire Israeli Super Green Pine radars are concluded. 
 
May 2009: South Korean possession of SM-2 naval interceptors is publicized for the first time 
by the U.S. Department of Defense. 
 
October 2011: Earliest South Korean media references to L-SAM program. 
 
October 2012: Earliest South Korean media references to interest in acquisition of PAC-3 
systems from the United States. 
 
October 1, 2013: ROK Armed Forces Day parade in Seoul displays multiple missile systems, 
including SM-2 naval interceptors. 
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Early 2016: First Cheongung (M-SAM) systems reported deployed. 
 
January 7, 2016: Fourth North Korean nuclear test, called its first thermonuclear test. 
 
February 7, 2016: North Korea conducts its second fully successful TD-2 launch. 
 
February 7, 2016: USFK releases text of a joint ROK-U.S. statement on negotiations 
concerning THAAD deployment in South Korea. 
 
July 7, 2016: USFK announces ROK-U.S. agreement on THAAD deployment. 
 
September 9, 2016: Fifth North Korean nuclear test. 
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